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GRISWOLD AND THE
DEFENSE OF TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE
BRADLEY P. JACOB*

I.

INTRODUCTION

There can be little doubt that our nation is locked in culture wars,1 especially concerning sexual and family issues, with two very different views
of the Good Life competing in the marketplace of ideas.2 The traditionalist
side believes that a family unit should consist of a husband and a wife,
married for life except in unusual circumstances, raising children who have
come into the home by birth or adoption.3 Sexual conduct is viewed as a
wonderful gift from God,4 but a gift that was designed for use within a
monogamous, heterosexual marriage.5 The progressive side believes that
*
Associate Professor, Regent University School of Law. B.A., summa cum laude, University
of Delaware; J.D., University of Chicago Law School. This article on marriage, like most things
of value in my life, would not be possible without the support of my beloved J.J., an amazing
woman who has been the perfect wife of a far-less-than-perfect lawyer for a quarter of a century.
Thanks to Dean Jeffrey A. Brauch, Regent University School of Law, and the American Center
for Law and Justice for their support in preparing this article, and to the North Dakota Law
Review for sponsoring this symposium issue. Special thanks to Jaired B. Hall, Regent Law
School Class of 2008, for excellent research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I think it no
business of the courts (as opposed to the political branches) to take sides in this culture war.”);
JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA passim (1991);
Richard Jensen, The Culture Wars, 1965-1995: A Historian’s Map, 29 J. SOC. HIST. 17 passim
(1995), available at http://members.aol.com/dann01/cwar.html (“We are at the midpoint of the
Culture Wars, with the lines of battle clearly delineated for all to see, but with the ultimate winners and losers still to be decided.”); see also David E. Campbell, A House Divided? What Social
Science Has to Say About the Culture War, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 59, 59 (2006)
(explaining that, while the United States may not be as politically or culturally polarized as many
claim, the term Culture War was “originally meant to convey . . . a tremendously significant
development in American religion, society, and politics”).
2. There is, however, some room for disagreement about what portion of the American
public is passionate about one of these competing worldviews, and what portion holds to a largely
uninterested middle ground. MORRIS P. FIORINA, SAMUEL J. ABRAMS & JEREMY C. POPE,
CULTURE WAR? THE MYTH OF A POLARIZED AMERICA 7-9, 15-32 (2004).
3. See, e.g., Wayne Allard, Protect Traditional Marriage, USA TODAY, May 31, 2006,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2006-05-31-opposing-view_x.htm;
LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE passim (2000).
4. See, e.g., Song of Solomon 1:2-4, 7:1-9.
5. Matthew 19:4-6 (NIV).
“Haven’t you read,” he replied, “that at the beginning the Creator ‘made them male
and female,’ and said, ‘For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be
united to his wife, and the two will become one flesh’? So they are no longer two, but
one. Therefore what God has joined together, let man not separate.”
Id.
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sexual activity is unconnected to marriage and should be enjoyed by anyone, in any circumstances that seem attractive, at least among consenting
adults.6 Progressives view marriage either as an irrelevant anachronism7 or
an institution for sexual legitimacy that ought to be redefined to include any
desired combination of numbers and sexes.8
The culture war battles have impacted a number of legal fields, but
none more than family law and constitutional law. This article focuses on
issues arising under the Constitution of the United States. Part II discusses
the appropriate venues and methods for deciding controversial public policy
issues under our constitutional system. Part III examines the sources of
individual rights under the Constitution. Part IV concludes by putting all of
this in the context of the culture wars and the modern sexual revolution,
suggesting that Griswold v. Connecticut9—generally reviled by cultural
traditionalists for its creation of the “right of privacy” which led to such
decisions as Roe v. Wade,10 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,11 and Lawrence v. Texas 12—may have been a much
stronger precedent for traditional morality and marriage than is generally
assumed—if only the Supreme Court had taken Griswold on its own terms.

6. Some more extreme proponents of progressive morality would not limit sexual conduct to
consenting adults. For example, the “North American Man/Boy Love Association (‘NAM/BLA’)
is an organization which advocates sexual relations between men and boys and the repeal of laws
which restrict such relations.” North American Man/Boy Love Ass’n v. FBI, No. 82 CIV 2185,
1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13944, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
7. Dennis E. Powell, Divorce-on-Demand: Forget about Gay Marriage—What about the
State of Regular Marriage?, NAT’L. REV., Oct. 27, 2003, available at http://findarticles.com/p/
articles/mi_m1282/is_20_55/ai_108892930/print (“Marriage is an anachronism. It’s a tax status.
Nothing more.”); see also John C. Sheldon, The Sleepwalker’s Tour of Divorce Law, 48 ME. L.
REV. 7, 48 (1996) (“The nuclear family belongs to the past; similarly, marriage seems not long for
the present.”).
8. Stanley Kurtz, Beyond Gay Marriage, THE WKLY. STANDARD, Aug. 4, 2003, available at
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/002/938xpsxy.asp.
(“Unlike
classic polygamy, which features one man and several women, polyamory comprises a
bewildering variety of sexual combinations. There are triads of one woman and two men;
heterosexual group marriages; groups in which some or all members are bisexual; lesbian groups,
and so forth.”).
9. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
12. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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II. WHERE AND HOW TO FIGHT THE CULTURE WARS
The battles of the culture wars are played out on many fronts—in
academia, in movies and television, and in churches,13 to name just a few.
From a legal perspective, conflicts over the future of marriage and family,
like most other major legal battles, take place in two arenas: the political
branches of government (primarily legislatures, but also occasionally
executive and administrative bodies), and the courts.14 The battles in the
political arena, while certainly hard-fought and controversial in terms of
outcome, are not particularly controversial in terms of process. Most
people, even the strongest advocates on both sides, generally agree that it is
appropriate for the political process to be used to resolve public policy
disputes. Our system is based on representative democracy, so we accept
that each side in a political debate will be attempting to persuade a majority
in the appropriate decision-making body that its position is the correct
one.15 The side that wins has won fair and square. As Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, certainly a well-known proponent of the traditionalist
position, has said:
By the time Coloradans were asked to vote on Amendment 2, their
exposure to homosexuals’ quest for social endorsement was not
limited to newspaper accounts of happenings in places such as
New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Key West. Three
Colorado cities—Aspen, Boulder, and Denver—had enacted
ordinances that listed “sexual orientation” as an impermissible
ground for discrimination, equating the moral disapproval of
homosexual conduct with racial and religious bigotry. The phenomenon had even appeared statewide: The Governor of Colorado
had signed an executive order pronouncing that “in the State of
Colorado we recognize the diversity in our pluralistic society and
strive to bring an end to discrimination in any form,” and directing

13. A current example is the debate over homosexuality within the American Episcopal
Church, which is threatening to create a permanent divide within the worldwide Anglican
Communion. Anglican Conference: Rwanda Church Drops Out, WASH. POST, July 7, 2007, at
B9,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/06/
AR2007070601838.html; Rebecca Trounson, Anglican Archbishops: No Consensus on Episcopal
Church, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2007, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/
nation/la-na-episcopal15dec15,1,1720359.story?coll=la-headlines-nation.
14. See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. Ch. 1, Part 41 (“Enlisted Personnel Separations”) (July 1, 1993
Edition), Appendix A (“Standards and Procedures”), Part 1 (“Reasons for Separation”), subpart H
(“Homosexuality”).
15. This decision-making body could be the United States Congress, a state legislature, a city
council, an administrative rule-making body, or, in the case of a referendum, the public at large.
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state agency-heads to “ensure non-discrimination” in hiring and
promotion based on, among other things, “sexual orientation.” I
do not mean to be critical of these legislative successes; homosexuals are as entitled to use the legal system for reinforcement of
their moral sentiments as is the rest of society. But they are subject
to being countered by lawful, democratic countermeasures as
well.16
The legal process of the culture wars becomes much more controversial
and problematic when the focus shifts from legislation to litigation, from
the statehouse to the courthouse. Our confidence in the fairness of the
process is shaken when strongly divisive issues that will impact the future
of our society, including “marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education,”17 are decided not by a majority
of the people, or by the people’s duly-elected representatives, but rather by
a handful of unelected, politically unaccountable judges.18 Unfortunately,
this has become the dominant pattern of the culture wars. Issue after issue
is decided by five members of the United States Supreme Court19—in many
cases a narrowly-divided Supreme Court, so that the policy preferences of
Sandra Day O’Connor or Anthony Kennedy become the law of the land, 20
imposing their views of the Good Life on the rest of the nation. This raises
serious questions about the legitimacy and desirability of the policy-making
process, and those questions are the focus of this article.
Under our constitutional system of government, the people’s representatives in legislative branches (national, state, and local) are designed to
be the primary makers of public policy.21 In the national government,

16. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 646 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
17. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
18. Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490, 520-21 (1989).
19. It takes five of nine Justices to make a majority opinion of the Supreme Court the
supreme law of the land. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (“[T]he federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution . . . . It follows that the interpretation of
the [Constitution] enunciated by this Court . . . is the supreme law of the land.”).
20. To see the typical closeness of Supreme Court decisions in this area, compare Gonzales
v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1615-18 (2007) with Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). In
Stenberg, Justice Kennedy dissented, disagreeing with Justice Breyer that the abortion regulations
at issue violated the test articulated in Casey, a case where Kennedy and O’Connor agreed, resulting in the overturning of certain abortion regulations. By the time of Gonzales, O’Connor was
no longer on the Court, and Kennedy’s view held sway by a slim 5-4 majority. Gonzales, 127 S.
Ct. at 1618.
21. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Gideon ed., 2001)
(“The judiciary . . . has . . . no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and
can take no active resolution whatever.”).
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Congress holds “all legislative powers.”22 The national Government’s
powers to regulate various areas of citizens’ lives are listed in Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution, which begins with the words, “The Congress
shall have power.”23 Legislation is the process of writing and passing laws.
By contrast, the President holds “executive power,”24 that is, he or she is to
“take care that the laws be faithfully executed,”25 and the Supreme Court is
vested with “the judicial power of the United States,”26 which is the power
to decide real disputes,27 involving specified categories of litigants, which
come before the Court.28 In other words, questions involving “What should
be the laws of the United States?” are to be settled by Congress through the
passing of legislation; the President and his Executive Branch carry out
those laws and see that they are enforced; and if a dispute should arise as to
the application or interpretation of the laws, it will be resolved through the
judicial process and ultimately by the Supreme Court. The courts, under
our constitutional system, were designed to be passive arbiters of disputes
between litigants, not policy makers. As Alexander Hamilton wrote in The
Federalist No. 78, one of the most famous passages in the Federalist Papers:
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power
must perceive, that, in a government in which they are separated
from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will
always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure
them. The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the
sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the
purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of
every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary,
has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction
either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take
no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither
FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of
its judgments.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“cases” and “controversies”).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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This simple view of the matter suggests several important
consequences. It proves incontestably, that the judiciary is beyond
comparison the weakest of the three departments of power; that it
can never attack with success either of the other two; and that all
possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their
attacks. It equally proves, that though individual oppression may
now and then proceed from the courts of justice, the general liberty
of the people can never be endangered from that quarter; I mean so
long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislature and the Executive. For I agree that “there is no liberty, if the
power of judging be not separated from the legislative and
executive powers.”29
Through most of our nation’s history, this would have seemed
obvious—Civics 101. But to our modern ears, there is a grating discord. In
a very short space of time, our culture has been converted to the belief that
the Supreme Court, composed of our nine “Platonic Guardians” 30 in dignified black robes, is the governmental institution that resolves our deepest
social tensions by telling us what the law is as it relates to some of the most
important social issues confronting our nation.31 Of course, it is not at all
new to suggest that the courts must “say what the law is” to decide a case
properly before it; a court must interpret the applicable law and determine
how it affects the legal rights of the litigants.32 What is relatively new,
however, is the almost-universal assumption that our most socially-divisive
legal issues will ultimately be resolved not by our elected representatives in
Congress, but by the Supreme Court. And if the Court’s resolution of the
issue seems wrong to a majority, or even a vast majority, of the American
people and our elected representatives, there is little that we can do about it.
Our only recourse is a constitutional amendment,33 which is, by design,

29. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 21, at 402 (citations omitted). Hamilton quoted the
famous political philosopher Montesquieu who wrote “Of the three powers above mentioned, the
judiciary is next to nothing.” CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF
LAWS 177 (Thomas Nugent trans., Batoche Books 2003) (1900).
30. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES 7374 (1958).
31. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (overturning a criminal law
against homosexual sodomy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (finding an anti-abortion
law unconstitutional); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (holding that an anticontraception law infringes on a fundamental right).
32. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is, emphatically, the
province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each
other, the courts must decide on the operation of each.”)
33. U.S. CONST. art. V.
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very difficult to accomplish; in practice, amending the constitution may be
even more difficult than the Framers intended.34
Over the past half-century, the Court has moved more and more into
the role of an active social policy maker, especially in areas where it may
perceive that the elected branches are not moving fast enough to correct
societal problems.35 How did this happen? How did the “least dangerous
branch” turn into our national guardians? How did a nation of 300 million
people come to a point where, on the most contentious issues of the day, we
are One Nation Under Anthony Kennedy?36 There are probably many
factors—legal, political, and sociological—and much has been written on
the subject for both academic and popular audiences.37
One major factor, certainly, has to do with the substantive breadth of
constitutional law. We will turn later to specific constitutional issues involving marriage, sexuality, and the definition of the family.38 In general, it
is clearly true that in the modern era the Supreme Court has moved from
applying the test of constitutionality only rarely, when a legislative
enactment clearly violated a textual provision of the Constitution,39 to much
34. Louis W. Hensler III, The Recurring Constitutional Convention: Therapy for a
Democratic Constitutional Republic Paralyzed by Hypocrisy, 7 TEX. REV. LAW & POL. 263, 30003 (2003). Theoretically, Congress and the President could also respond to an overreaching
Supreme Court by impeaching, removing and replacing Justices who impose their own policy
choices on the nation under the pretense of interpreting the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2,
cl. 5; art. I, § 3, cl. 6 & 7; art. II, § 4. This has never been attempted (although President Franklin
Roosevelt toyed with a similar idea in his “court packing” plan in 1936-37), and would be highly
controversial. See Christopher Shea, Supreme Switch?, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 4, 2005, at D1
(analyzing whether FDR’s controversial “threat” changed the course of constitutional history).
35. See infra notes 39-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the development of the
Supreme Court as a significant maker of public policy.
36. It is too early in the Roberts Court to know for sure, but if it develops that the Supreme
Court now has four fairly consistent “conservative/traditionalist” votes (Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito) and four fairly consistent “liberal/progressive” votes (Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) on issues such as marriage, family, sexuality, and abortion, then Justice Kennedy’s vote will almost always be the swing vote that determines the
outcome. The entire focus of constitutional litigation could become an attempt to win Kennedy’s
favor. Consider, for example, the Casey, Carhart I, and Carhart II trio. In Casey, Justice
Kennedy joined O’Connor’s plurality opinion which invalidated on constitutional grounds certain
state abortion regulations. 505 U.S. 833, 869-79. Justice Kennedy, however, believed that the
abortion restriction in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 956-57 (2000), was appropriate, so he
disagreed with Justice O’Connor and dissented. When the Court in Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S.
Ct. 1610, 1618 (2007), addressed an almost identical issue, now that the more conservative Justice
Alito had replaced O’Connor, Kennedy found himself again in the majority.
37. See, e.g., MARK R. LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK: HOW THE SUPREME COURT IS DESTROYING
AMERICA passim (2005); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS passim (1962).
38. Infra Part IV.
39. The Supreme Court first exercised the power of judicial review to declare a federal
statute unconstitutional in the famous case of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
It did not use this power again for more than half a century, until the infamous Dred Scott
decision, Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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more expansive interpretations of the Constitution, in which the text is
merely a springboard for the Justices to apply their own sense of fundamental fairness.40 Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, the Court has
found statutes unconstitutional with greater and greater frequency.41 As the
Court has turned more legal and public policy issues, previously the
province of the legislature, into matters of federal constitutional law, it is
not surprising that our culture has increasingly come to assume that policymaking is the Supreme Court’s proper role in our constitutional system.
However, there are also important historical factors to note throughout
the last century. The genesis of the policy-making Supreme Court came in
the so-called “Lochner 42 era” in the first third of the twentieth century, as
the Court used “economic substantive due process” to invalidate state and
federal legislative efforts to regulate wages and working conditions, and to
pull the United States out of the Great Depression of the 1930s. As one
federal appellate judge described this period:
The Supreme Court of the 1930s earned the increased scrutiny it
received—along with FDR’s threat to pack the Court with jurists
more sympathetic to his legislation—not solely because its
decisions were “unpopular.” Unpopular though they were, the
Justices’ holdings were principally criticized for being little more
than the thinly veiled and bluntly expressed policy preferences of a
group of “Angry Old Men.” They were, in short, grounded in
nothing the public or the political branches recognized as the customary reasoned basis for opinions of the nation’s highest court:
the most noteworthy constitutional basis the Justices provided for
their actions was the vague notion of “substantive due process,” a
concept conspicuously applied in the now-infamous case of Dred
Scott v. Sandford, which pronounced the constitutional right of one
human being to hold another as property.43
More recently, the modern era of using constitutional law to make
policy seems to have built its energy out of Brown v. Board of Education44

40. Bradley P. Jacob, Back to Basics: Constitutional Meaning and “Tradition,” 39 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 261, 265-66, 265 n.26 (2007).
41. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (providing a dramatic example, in
which the Court held unconstitutional all or part of some two hundred federal statutes that had
made use of the so-called “legislative veto”).
42. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
43. Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Today’s Senate Confirmation Battles and the Role of the
Federal Judiciary, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 169, 175-76 (2003).
44. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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and the civil rights movement. Despite its positive impact on civil rights,45
one unforeseen and negative consequence of Brown is that it seems to have
given the Supreme Court the idea that it can jump in and solve difficult,
divisive American public policy issues by pushing the nation to an
enlightened future, even if public opinion and political institutions were not
so sure about the enlightened course.
The civil rights movement was the first major issue in our nation’s
history in which private advocates deliberately used the Supreme Court’s
constitutional decision-making—and used it very effectively—as a tool for
engineering social change over a number of years and a series of cases. It is
not hard to understand why advocates opposing racial segregation and Jim
Crow laws turned to the courts for remedies. In the 1930s, 1940s, and
1950s, there were strong forces for racism in the United States Congress
and many state legislatures, especially, but not limited to, those in the deep
South.46 It did not appear that legislation was the tool that would end
legally enforced racial discrimination.
Thus, advocates for racial equality turned to the Supreme Court. Attorneys working with the National Association for Advancement of Colored
People, led by the brilliant Charles Hamilton Houston47 and the master
tactician Thurgood Marshall,48 devised an incremental strategy of litigating
case after case,49 chipping away at the legal underpinnings of Plessy v.

45. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495-96 (holding that racially segregated public schools violate
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, thus beginning the movement toward
racial equality under law).
46. Years after Brown was decided, many southern state legislatures were still fighting
desegregation. See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 432-33 (1968) (footnote and
citations omitted):
The respondent School Board continued the segregated operation of the system after
the Brown decisions, presumably on the authority of several statutes enacted by
Virginia in resistance to those decisions. Some of these statutes were held to be
unconstitutional on their face or as applied. One statute, the Pupil Placement Act, not
repealed until 1966, divested local boards of authority to assign children to particular
schools and placed that authority in a State Pupil Placement Board. Under that Act
children were each year automatically reassigned to the school previously attended
unless upon their application the State Board assigned them to another school;
students seeking enrollment for the first time were also assigned at the discretion of
the State Board. To September 1964, no Negro pupil had applied for admission to the
New Kent school under this statute and no white pupil had applied for admission to
the Watkins school.
Id.
47. Leland Ware, A Difference in Emphasis: Charles Houston’s Transformation of Legal
Education, 32 HOW. L.J. 479, 479 (1989).
48. See generally JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY
passim (1998).
49. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950).
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Ferguson 50 and legalized segregation. Their strategy culminated in the
1954 Brown decision, which, while it did not immediately end governmentenforced racial discrimination in the United States, at least turned the corner
and began the slow, difficult process of desegregation.51
At the NAACP Marshall assisted Houston in the development and
implementation of an “equalization” strategy that involved challenging the
southern states’ failure to establish graduate and professional schools for
black students. Such a strategy allowed the NAACP to challenge discrimination without directly attacking the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v.
Ferguson. The equalization strategy relied on the belief that southern states
could not afford to maintain separate facilities for African American
students that were actually equal to white schools. After Houston left the
NAACP in 1938, Marshall became the director of the legal department. In
the years that followed Marshall won cases challenging discrimination in
teacher salaries, housing, public transportation, voting, and criminal prosecutions. By the time Brown reached the Supreme Court a line of precedents
had been established in which the Plessy rationale had been completely
undermined.52
All of this seems great from a position of fifty years’ hindsight. It
would be difficult today to find someone who would argue against the outcome of Brown. The notion that racial discrimination—certainly racial
discrimination by the government—is a bad thing has filtered throughout
our entire culture.53 The Supreme Court, or perhaps more accurately, the
NAACP’s legal strategy using the Supreme Court, has been rather spectacularly successful in the area of racial segregation. The American public
was not ready to demand racial equality in the early and mid-twentieth
century, but the Supreme Court’s decisions led the way to a new, enlightened way of thinking about race relations, and the American public followed the Court’s lead, albeit slowly and with many fits and starts.
Constitutional litigation succeeded in changing not merely the law, but the
social fabric of the nation.
50. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
51. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. II, 394 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (stating that the process of
desegregation should begin “with all deliberate speed”).
52. Leland Ware, Book Review, 86 J. AM. HIST. 1392, 1393 (Dec. 1999) (reviewing
WILLIAMS, supra note 48), available at http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/jah/86.3/
br_88.html; see also WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S
TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 29-34 (Jack M.
Balkin ed., 2001).
53. This does not mean that there are no longer individual racists, and pockets of group
racism, in the United States today, as the author of this article (father of African-American
children) is keenly aware. However, these attitudes have become counter-cultural and have
increasingly gone underground.
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Problematically, in the fifty years since Brown was decided, virtually
everyone—Justices and judges, Presidents, Senators and Representatives,
lawyers, and the general public—has bought into the idea that constitutional
litigation in the Supreme Court is the proper and primary venue for resolving divisive public policy issues and changing the public’s social conscience.54 The people’s representatives, accountable to their constituents
every two or six years, no longer hold the primary place at the policymaking table, creating the often-discussed “countermajoritarian dilemma.”55 One can argue that it is both fundamentally undemocratic, and
totally against the Founders’ conception of our constitutional system, for
major societal issues like the definition of marriage and the future of the
family to be decided this way.
In addition, the discourse of public policy debate has been cheapened:
instead of a thorough study of the arguments for and against each possible
outcome, litigants strive to express their positions as violations of various
“rights”—some rights are clear under the Constitution, some more questionable, and others, such as the right to “be happy,” are downright silly.56
Many have argued that this reliance on “rights talk” makes it very difficult
to achieve wise public policy outcomes.57 But if courts are determining
whose “rights” have been violated in hotly contested matters of social
policy, it becomes crucial to know the source and meaning of those rights.
III. THE SOURCES OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
Much has been written, by this author58 and others,59 concerning the
source and identity of individual rights under the Constitution. Rather than
repeating that discussion in detail, a brief summary will suffice.

54. This is not to say that the legislative process is never used today to resolve important
public issues, even issues of fundamental rights. See generally Bradley P. Jacob, Free Exercise in
the “Lobbying Nineties,” 84 NEB. L. REV. 795, 796 (2006). However, even when legislation is a
primary legal tool, there is often a sense that one has to wait for the Supreme Court to rule before
really being certain of the outcome. See id. at 826 n.131 (Rep. Jerrold Nadler expressing the view
that Congress could simply enact legislation, even believing it to be unconstitutional, and allow
the Court to straighten it out).
55. BICKEL, supra note 37, at 16-23; Hensler, supra note 34, at 273-75.
56. Jacob, supra note 40, at 275 n.80.
57. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE
passim (1993).
58. Jacob, supra note 40, at 274-87.
59. See, e.g., Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris,
102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1557-73 (2004); Helen K. Michael, The Role of Natural Law in Early
American Constitutionalism: Did the Founders Contemplate Judicial Enforcement of “Unwritten”
Individual Rights?, 69 N.C. L. REV. 421, 423-24 (1991); Michael W. McConnell, A Moral Realist
Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 64 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 89, 90-91 (1988); Calvin R.
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Although the Declaration of Independence built the case for the
existence of the United States of America as an independent nation based
individual rights arising from natural law, granted by the Creator60 and not
subject to revocation or revision by the government,61 the original text of
the Constitution contained very little specific protection for individual
rights.62 Many of the Founders believed that it was unnecessary, and perhaps dangerous, to list individual rights in the national constitution, because
citizens’ primary protection from the federal government was found in the
central government’s structural constraints and limited powers.63
However, the arguments of George Mason and others who felt the
absence of significant individual rights protections was a major weakness in
the proposed Constitution64 brought about a political deal that led to the Bill
of Rights being proposed and approved by the First Congress, and ratified
by the states as the first ten amendments to the Constitution in 1791.65 The
Bill of Rights, as enacted, placed restrictions only upon the national government; it did not restrict the states in any way.66 The Civil War amendments
changed the balance of federalism by creating new national constitutional
constraints on the states.67 The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment 68 was almost certainly drafted to provide substantive protection of individual rights from state interference, but its value was

Massey, Federalism and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth Amendment, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 305, 33132 (1987).
60. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”)
61. Id.
That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed—That whenever any Form of Government
becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it,
and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and
organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their
Safety and Happiness.
Id.
62. But see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (rights protected from federal violation) and § 10 (rights
protected from state violation).
63. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 84, 85 (Alexander Hamilton).
64. Jacob, supra note 40, at 276 n.89.
65. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 83-84
(Kermit L. Hall ed., 2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter OXFORD]. Ten of the twelve amendments proposed
in the Bill of Rights were ratified in 1791. One of the two that failed immediate ratification
became the 27th Amendment more than 200 years later, in 1992. Id. at 83.
66. Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833).
67. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, XIV, XV.
68. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2 (“No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”).
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largely destroyed within a decade of the Civil War by Supreme Court
misinterpretation.69
Because the Privileges or Immunities Clause was stripped of most of
its meaning, and because the Supreme Court has never demonstrated a
willingness to revisit that decision,70 efforts by the Supreme Court to
enforce individual rights against state violation have primarily focused on
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment71 through the oxymoronic doctrine of “substantive due process.” The idea that the substance
of a law could so badly interfere with liberty, regardless of the legal
process, that it “could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of
law” was introduced by the Supreme Court in the infamous Dred Scott v.
Sanford decision of 1857.72 This notion served as the backbone of the notquite-as-infamous-as-Dred-Scott era of Lochner and economic substantive
due process.73 Although the point was not clear in Griswold itself, substantive due process is the heart of the Court’s modern “right of privacy”
jurisprudence.74
Even given the switch from the logical protection of citizens’ privileges
or immunities to the illogic of substantive due process, and the initial debate
within the Supreme Court about how many Bill of Rights protections ought
to be incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment to apply against the

69. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). See generally Jacob, supra note
40, at 276-77.
70. But see Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 527-28 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
As THE CHIEF JUSTICE points out, it comes as quite a surprise that the majority
relies on the Privileges or Immunities Clause at all in this case. That is because, as I
have explained, The Slaughter-House Cases sapped the Clause of any meaning.
Although the majority appears to breathe new life into the Clause today, it fails to
address its historical underpinnings or its place in our constitutional jurisprudence.
Because I believe that the demise of the Privileges or Immunities Clause has
contributed in no small part to the current disarray of our Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence, I would be open to reevaluating its meaning in an appropriate case.
Before invoking the Clause, however, we should endeavor to understand what the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought that it meant. We should also consider
whether the Clause should displace, rather than augment, portions of our equal
protection and substantive due process jurisprudence. The majority’s failure to
consider these important questions raises the specter that the Privileges or Immunities
Clause will become yet another convenient tool for inventing new rights, limited
solely by the “predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members of this
Court.”
Id. (citations omitted)
71. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3 (“[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”).
72. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857).
73. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
74. See infra Part IV.
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states,75 there is today a pretty broad consensus that at most of the
individual liberties identified in the first eight amendments now bind the
states through their incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendments.76 The
trickier question is this: Does the Fourteenth Amendment protect any fundamental individual rights that are not listed in the text of the first eight
amendments, or elsewhere in the Constitution from state interference?
If one accepts the logically unassailable premise that original meaning
textualism is the only appropriate method for interpreting the Constitution
without destroying its purpose,77 then the very idea of nontextual rights
starts off with two strikes against it.78 How can one interpret and apply the
text of the Constitution by finding rights that are not in that text? To state
the question is to observe that it does not make sense. In addition, the
concept of courts applying nontextual rights through substantive due process creates an enormous practical problem: What are those rights, and why
should a handful of politically-unaccountable federal judges or Justices be
able to decide what they are, sometimes over the objections of millions of
citizens? This has the potential to turn constitutional law into pure politics,
an opportunity for the Justices to choose the political outcomes that they
favor and force them on the nation. 79 As the Court itself has noted:
Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for
this Court. There are risks when the judicial branch gives enhanced protection to certain substantive liberties without the guidance of the more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. As the
history of the Lochner era demonstrates, there is reason for
concern lest the only limits to such judicial intervention become
75. Compare Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (“selective incorporation”
approach) with id. at 68 (Black, J., dissenting) (“total incorporation” of Bill of Rights).
76. OXFORD, supra note 65, at 491-92, 534. The only Bill of Rights protections that have not
been incorporated by the Supreme Court are the Fifth Amendment right to a criminal indictment
and the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury in civil cases. Id.
77. Jacob, supra note 40, at 264-74; Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1134-48
(2003).
78. If one takes the “living Constitution” approach, of course, this is not a problem at all, as
witness the myriad of cases, books, and law journal articles written from that assumption. See,
e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (finding a constitutional right “to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life”); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (“The document that the plurality construes today is unfamiliar to me. It is not the
living charter that I have taken to be our Constitution . . . .”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54
(1973) (finding that “the abortion decision” is protected as a constitutional right, notwithstanding
the absence of that right in the Constitution’s text and history); William J. Brennan, Jr., Speech at
Georgetown University (Oct. 12, 1985), in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN
CONSTITUTION 11 (Paul G. Cassell ed., The Federalist Society 1986).
79. One might argue that the Court has often thoroughly exploited this potential.
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the predilections of those who happen at the time to be Members
of this Court. That history counsels caution and restraint.80
On the other side of the equation, at least for the textualist, is the Ninth
Amendment, which states, “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.”81 It is certainly possible to read the Ninth Amendment as textual
confirmation that there are other fundamental rights that must be enforced
by the federal judiciary.82 This is always tempting, because just about
everyone, regardless of political perspective, can identify some rights that
seem so incredibly important as to require judicial application if they are
not appropriately enforced through the political process.83
Although this conclusion may be politically tempting, it does not
necessarily follow from the text of the Ninth Amendment. One problem is
this: If the text of the Ninth Amendment meant that there were other
federally-enforceable fundamental rights, what would have been the
constitutional means of enforcing those rights at the time the Bill of Rights
was ratified? The Ninth Amendment speaks of rights that are not contained
in the remainder of the Constitution, including the remainder of the Bill of
Rights. Although there is a federal Due Process Clause in the Fifth Amendment,84 the concept of substantive due process was not dreamed up for
many years. To say that the Ninth Amendment identified additional fundamental constitutional rights, which would later be enforced against the
states under the Fourteenth Amendment, is to say that these same fundamental constitutional rights were unenforceable against the federal government when the Bill of Rights was ratified. This, surely, would be a very
peculiar textualist result.
There are other reasons to believe that the Ninth Amendment does not
affirm the existence of nontextual, fundamental, federal, judicially enforceable individual rights. As one commentator has written:
The proper understanding of the Amendment—“The enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people”—is that it states a rule
80. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) (citations omitted).
81. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
82. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-99 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
83. Compare the modern “right of privacy” discussed infra Part IV, which is generally
viewed as essential by political liberals, with the right of parents to control the education and
upbringing of their children, which is favored by many social and political conservatives. See
generally Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
84. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4 (“[N]or [shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”).
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of what we today would call “nonpreemption.” The specification
of federal constitutional rights, possessed by individuals or by the
people generally against the federal government (and a few possessed against state governments, set forth in Article I, Section
10), was not to work a pro tanto repeal of state law rights possessed against state governments. Such a disclaimer was necessary (if at all) only to counter Federalist arguments (like
Hamilton’s) that adopting a Bill of Rights might be construed to
have such an effect, thereby enlarging federal power and diminishing individual rights. The text of the Amendment, its political
context, and historical evidence of its meaning and purpose all
confirm this reading.
Beyond this, one could infer a general political principle that the
adoption in positive constitutional law of particular rights should
not be understood to supersede the natural law rights of man.
There would scarcely be much need to state this, however, as no
one at the time would have assumed that human law could justly
abridge God-given natural rights. At the same time, no one would
have mistaken the language of the Ninth Amendment as conferring, as a matter of positive law, unspecified natural law rights.
At most, the Ninth Amendment could be read as stating the truism
that nothing in the Constitution legitimately could take away the
natural rights of all human beings—including such things as life,
liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the right of the people as a
collective to alter or abolish their form of government whenever it
becomes destructive of its proper ends of securing those rights.
The adoption of a Bill of Rights does not somehow repeal by
implication the natural rights principles embraced in the
Declaration of Independence.85
The idea that there are no nontextual fundamental rights to be enforced
under the Fourteenth Amendment, even with the assistance of the Ninth,
may not only be the solution to the “personal predilections” problem, but
also the correct textual interpretation of the Constitution. However, at this
point, this approach is even further from the mainstream of legal thought
than original meaning textualism itself, and so may require some time to
catch on.
85. Michael Stokes Paulsen, Colloquium: How To Interpret the Constitution (and How Not
To), 115 YALE L.J. 2037, 2047-48 (2006); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Paulsen, J.,
Dissenting, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS
REWRITE AMERICA’S MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION 196, 198-99 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005).
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If one accepts that substantive due process includes fundamental individual rights not found in the text of the Constitution, is there no hope for
an understanding of fundamental rights that has real, fixed meaning rather
than mere personal opinions? Have we at that point descended into
constitutional law that is defined by the fads of the day, the personal
opinions and idiosyncrasies of five Supreme Court Justices? Is there,
within that understanding, no way of restoring any principle or lasting
content to fundamental rights jurisprudence?
Only one possibility appears in the case law, although it has been
observed as often in the breach as in the application. This position is that
the language of the Constitution, including the Ninth Amendment, permits
judicial protection of rights not specified in the text, but only when those
rights are self-evident 86 to all, and only when they have been broadly accepted in Anglo-American law and culture for centuries.87 The Court, using
this analytical approach, has said that in order to be judicially recognized, a
fundamental right must be “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” and
“so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.” 88
For example, in its 1997 decision of Washington v. Glucksberg,89 the
Supreme Court found that there is no fundamental constitutional right to
end one’s life through suicide, or to seek assistance in committing suicide.
Regarding substantive due process rights, the Court stated:
We begin, as we do in all due-process cases, by examining our
Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices. In almost every
State—indeed, in almost every western democracy—it is a crime
to assist a suicide. The States’ assisted-suicide bans are not innovations. Rather, they are longstanding expressions of the States’
commitment to the protection and preservation of all human
life . . . .
Our established method of substantive-due-process analysis has
two primary features: First, we have regularly observed that the
Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights
and liberties which are, objectively, “deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition,” and “implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,” such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist if they
were sacrificed.” Second, we have required in substantive-due86.
87.
88.
89.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
See Jacob, supra note 40, at 281-83.
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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process cases a “careful description” of the asserted fundamental
liberty interest. Our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices thus provide the crucial “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking,” that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due Process
Clause . . . .
The history of the law’s treatment of assisted suicide in this
country has been and continues to be one of the rejection of nearly
all efforts to permit it. That being the case, our decisions lead us
to conclude that the asserted “right” to assistance in committing
suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause.90
Justice Scalia, in his famous footnote 6 of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 91
suggested an additional limiting factor to make sure that alleged fundamental rights are truly rooted in longstanding history: identify the right in
question at the most specific level at which it could be identified.92 Thus,
Justice Scalia asked whether there is a traditional fundamental right of a
man to have a parental relationship with a child that he fathered through an
adulterous relationship with another man’s wife, while the Court’s dissenters characterized the alleged right as “parenthood.”93
This is not to say that finding nontextual fundamental rights through
substantive due process is the correct interpretation of the Constitution’s
text;94 instead, it suggests that even if nontextual rights are accepted as
representing a legitimate methodology, they can still be limited through a
focus on liberties that have been self-evident through centuries of history.
This approach will prevent constitutional law from degenerating into the
mere fads and current policy preferences of the Justices.
IV. APPLICATION: GRISWOLD AND THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY
So far, this article has explored the ways in which the culture wars’
battles are fought in our society, and we have seen that the federal courts
constitute a dubious forum for such battles.95 The constitutional text and
history as the sources of fundamental individual rights were explored, and it
was suggested that the correct constitutional understanding of judiciallyenforceable rights is that they are limited to those specifically identified in
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710, 720-21, 728 (1997).
491 U.S. 110 (1989).
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127-28 & n.6.
Id. at 128 & n.6.
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.
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the text of the Constitution.96 However, if non-textual rights are considered, they can still be kept from total subjectivity by requiring that they
be “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” and “so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” 97
It is time to bring the discussion back around to Griswold, and the defense
of traditional marriage (that being, after all, the title of the article).
Nowhere can the Supreme Court’s self-confident plunge into the
resolution of social conflicts and the establishment of cultural values better
be seen than in the realm of marriage and the family. The Court in recent
years has been reasonably consistent in grounding its decisions relating to
marriage, family, and the creation and destruction of children in the liberal/
progressive culture wars camp, and in the remnants of the 1960s sexual
revolution.98 One can argue that abortion has become the “third rail”99 of
Supreme Court decision-making. Whatever constitutional text may be under examination, whatever other principles of constitutional law may come
into play, when they come up against the right to abortion, they invariably
lose. As Justice Scalia noted:
What is before us, after all, is a speech regulation directed against
the opponents of abortion, and it therefore enjoys the benefit of the
“ad hoc nullification machine” that the Court has set in motion to
push aside whatever doctrines of constitutional law stand in the
way of that highly favored practice. Having deprived abortion
opponents of the political right to persuade the electorate that
abortion should be restricted by law, the Court today continues
and expands its assault upon their individual right to persuade
women contemplating abortion that what they are doing is wrong.
Because, like the rest of our abortion jurisprudence, today’s decision is in stark contradiction of the constitutional principles we
apply in all other contexts, I dissent.
Colorado’s statute makes it a criminal act knowingly to approach
within 8 feet of another person on the public way or sidewalk area
within 100 feet of the entrance door of a health care facility for the
purpose of passing a leaflet to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in
oral protest, education, or counseling with such person. Whatever
96. See supra Part III.
97. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
98. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
99. The reference is to the rail on a subway or electrified transit system through which highvoltage current is transferred, so that touching a third rail is generally fatal.
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may be said about the restrictions on the other types of expressive
activity, the regulation as it applies to oral communications is
obviously and undeniably content-based. A speaker wishing to
approach another for the purpose of communicating any message
except one of protest, education, or counseling may do so without
first securing the other’s consent. Whether a speaker must obtain
permission before approaching within eight feet—and whether he
will be sent to prison for failing to do so—depends entirely on
what he intends to say when he gets there. I have no doubt that
this regulation would be deemed content based in an instant if the
case before us involved antiwar protesters, or union members
seeking to “educate” the public about the reasons for their strike.
“It is,” we would say, “the content of the speech that determines
whether it is within or without the statute’s blunt prohibition.” But
the jurisprudence of this Court has a way of changing when
abortion is involved.100
In Hill, the case in which this dissent was written, the need to promote
abortion rights triumphed even over such a core constitutional principle as
the requirement that government not assess negative consequences against
individuals based on their ideas, the content of their speech.101 And even
Justice O’Connor, generally one of the Court’s progressive leaders on
abortion, expressed the following view:
This Court’s abortion decisions have already worked a major distortion in the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence. Today’s decision goes further, and makes it painfully clear that no legal rule or
doctrine is safe from ad hoc nullification by this Court when an
occasion for its application arises in a case involving state regulation of abortion. The permissible scope of abortion regulation is
not the only constitutional issue on which this Court is divided,
but—except when it comes to abortion—the Court has generally
refused to let such disagreements, however longstanding or deeply
felt, prevent it from evenhandedly applying uncontroversial legal
doctrines to cases that come before it.102

100. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 741-42 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original) (citations omitted); see also Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 785
(1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
101. Hill, 530 U.S. at 719-24.
102. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 814 (1986)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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If abortion isn’t the third rail of constitutional law, then homosexuality
certainly is. Once again, in the context of a particular, and particularly
divisive, social issue, all of the normal rules and assumptions of constitutional interpretation go out the window. When the Supreme Court decides a
case under the Fourteenth Amendment and finds that no suspect classification or fundamental right is at stake, it applies rational basis scrutiny.103
To survive a constitutional challenge under rational basis scrutiny, the government need only show that its statute or action is “rationally related to a
legitimate government interest.”104 This is an exceptionally deferential
standard; the government almost never loses under rational basis scrutiny,
because government rarely acts in a way that can legitimately be characterized as “irrational.” Even if a judge disagrees with a particular law or
public policy, the judge is almost never so arrogant as to say, in effect,
“anyone who disagrees with me on this point must be insane.” The one
exception: cases involving homosexuality. In both Romer v. Evans105 and
Lawrence v. Texas,106 the Supreme Court made its decision without finding
homosexual sodomy to be a fundamental right, or those who practice it to
be a suspect class, either finding would have triggered a more rigorous form
of scrutiny, but rather by finding the amendment and the statute, respectively, to be irrational.107 In the Court’s view, no sane person today could
believe that these laws were legitimate public policy—notwithstanding the
fact that throughout the centuries of Anglo-American legal history there
have been many statutes prohibiting homosexuality and other extra-marital
sexual conduct, and only a handful of very recent legislative acts granting
legal protection to sexual orientation. The Court has decided how it wants
the culture wars to be decided, and popular opinion no longer matters.
What is the common factor in these abortion and homosexuality cases?
The Court assumes that sexuality is without moral content. It assumes that
sexual conduct between a husband and a wife, married for life and raising a
family together, deserves no more respect and honor than sexual conduct
involving an unmarried man and woman, or a gay couple, or two teenagers
in the back seat of a car, or a group, or people and animals.108 The Court

103. See, e.g., Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1988).
104. Id. at 14.
105. 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (involving a Colorado constitutional amendment, adopted by a
significant majority of statewide voters, prohibiting municipalities from creating special legal
protections on the basis of “sexual orientation”).
106. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (declaring unconstitutional a state statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy).
107. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580-85.
108. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority in Lawrence,
drew no distinction within sexual conduct, but described the issue before the Court as the freedom
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assumes that the idea that sexual acts should be practiced only by a heterosexual married couple is a quaint anachronism from a bygone era. Therefore, since the availability of abortion makes it easier for people to have sex
without the complication of a baby, abortion is a good thing.109 And since
marital relations have no more moral validity than unmarried or homosexual conduct, it would be irrational for any jurisdiction to use its laws to
promote its view of The Good Life in the context of sex and family.
The positions that the Court is trying to promote are certainly rational.
Many people in our society hold these views, and they are free to try to
influence public policy through the elected branches of government.110 But
the idea that sexual conduct outside of heterosexual marriage is a good
thing that should be promoted and held without societal stigma is not the
only rational response. Even today, vast numbers of Americans disagree.

of people “as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.” Id. See also Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives
may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike”).
109. See Betty Friedan, Abortion: A Woman’s Civil Right, Speech at the First National
Conference for Repeal of Abortion Laws (January 1969), in BETTY FRIEDAN, IT CHANGED MY
LIFE 171, available at http://guerillawomentn.blogspot.com/2006/02/betty-friedan-abortionwomans-civil.htm.
The right of woman to control her reproductive process must be established as a basic,
inalienable civil right, not to be denied or abridged by the state. What right has any
man to say to any woman-you must bear this child? What right has any state to say?
This is a woman’s right, not a technical question needing the sanction of the state, or
to be debated in terms of technicalities-they are all irrelevant. This question can only
be confronted in terms of the basic personhood and dignity of woman, which is
violated forever if she does not have the right to control her own reproductive process.
This is the only way that abortion is worth talking about; we’re going to demand it and
see what happens. . .
Id. See also Margaret Montoya, Un/Braiding Stories About Law, Sexuality and Morality, 24
CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 1, 10 (2003).
We must break this silence. We should initiate an ad campaign that identifies those of
us who have had abortions, those of us who have survived sexual abuse or sexual
assaults, those of us who love other women. This ad campaign should emphasize that
our responses to sexuality are moral ones. Good and moral women have abortions.
Id. Elizabeth Bartholet, Beyond Biology: The Politics of Adoption & Reproduction, 2 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 5, 12 (1995) (“[T]he recent edition of the Boston Women’s Health
Collective’s Our Bodies Ourselves, takes an extremely hostile position on adoption. The advice
given to birth mothers is pure and simple: abortion is good, and adoption is bad.”); Stephanie
Seguin, NOW Emergency Campaign Plans for Abortion Speakouts (2002), available at
http://www.afn.org/ iguana/archives/2002_01/20020105/htm.
Speakouts shattered the silence on abortion, showing other women that they were not
alone, and indicating how the demand for abortion without restriction was a central
part of the fight for women’s freedom in every realm . . . abortion isn’t always a big
scary deal or something we did because we were “irresponsible”; it’s as simple as not
wanting to have a child.
Id.
110. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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And there is certainly nothing in the text of the United States Constitution
that appears to dictate answers to questions like these.
The “culture wars” cases 111 do not rest on broad societal agreement;
although more Americans accept non-marital sexuality and non-traditional
family structures now than in the past, there is no evidence that this has
become a culture-wide consensus. Just as importantly, these cases have no
constitutional authority to support them. Not one word in the United States
Constitution speaks to the issues of sex, marriage, or abortion. And even if
one accepts the idea of nontextual due process rights, it is clear that the
“rights” to have sex outside of marriage, to redefine marriage, to engage in
homosexuality, and to abort children are neither “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty,”112 nor “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental.”113 The Court’s discovery of these
“rights” can be seen as no more than an effort to mold legal and societal
policy from the bench. “If Americans cannot understand sexual freedom,”
the Court’s opinions suggest, “then we will simply impose it on them and
they will, sooner or later, come to realize that we were right.”
There are many problems with this approach. First, it is illegitimate.
The Constitution gives the Supreme Court no power to act as a national
super-legislature on matters of social policy and cultural mores. Second, it
is not working. Just as Roe v. Wade114 may be best understood as an
attempt by the Court to end abortion’s divisiveness, which backfired by
increasing division, there is no evidence that the Court’s attempt to redefine
marriage and sexuality will, in the final analysis, persuade the American
people. All of these issues relating to marriage, family, sexuality and
abortion continue to polarize American culture.

111. In particular, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and other abortion-related cases which work to
disconnect sexual activity from its marriage and family contexts, as well as Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620 (1996), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
112. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). It is not hard to imaging a free society
with representative government and the absence of these rights, since the United States was such a
society for most of its history.
113. Id. The fact that these activities were subject to criminal proscription throughout most
of Anglo-American legal history makes it quite certain that they have not been viewed as
fundamental rights. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 952-53 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part); Lawrence, 593 U.S. at 596 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Whether homosexual sodomy was prohibited by a law targeted at same-sex sexual
relations or by a more general law prohibiting both homosexual and heterosexual
sodomy, the only relevant point is that it was criminalized—which suffices to establish
that homosexual sodomy is not a right ‘deeply rooted in our Nation’s history and
tradition.’
Id.
114. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

1222

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 83:1199

Finally, this effort destroys the fundamental meaning and purpose of a
written Constitution. The Constitution is meant to act as an outer parameter
for the actions of popularly elected governments. It is difficult to amend
because, as the basic ground rules of our political order, it should not easily
sway with the political winds and social fads of the day. If a majority of the
Supreme Court can overrule the elected branches of government, without
support in constitutional text, simply because they believe that the times
have changed, then the Constitution is meaningless and we would be better
off without it.115
What, then of Griswold? Modern substantive due process jurisprudence began in 1965 with Griswold, in which a Connecticut statute banning
the use of contraceptives was held unconstitutional in its application to
married couples.116 Because Griswold began the modern path of substantive due process that led to Casey and Lawrence, it is easy for moral
traditionalists to attack it. And, indeed, there is much about the Griswold
opinion to ridicule. It accepts without any real analysis the idea that there
are judicially enforceable nontextual constitutional rights, and it does so
without even the honesty of a substantive due process analysis.117 Instead,
the Court came up with the bizarre notion of “penumbras”118 of the First,
Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments that created constitutional
“zones of privacy.”119 There is no way to defend any of this as an exercise
to determine the correct meaning of the written words of the United States
Constitution.
But I have come to praise Griswold, not to bury it.120 Even given these
weaknesses, if one can get past the use of nontextual fundamental rights,
Griswold need not have been the disaster for traditional marriage, family
and sexuality that its progeny have become and are becoming. Griswold
defined the right that it created in a way that survives analysis under the
115. Jacob, supra note 40, at 264-74.
116. Griswold, 318 U.S. at 485-86.
117. By the time Roe came around eight years later, the Court had clearly identified its right
of privacy jurisprudence as grounded in substantive due process. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
153 (1973) (“This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept
of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is . . . is broad enough to
encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”).
118. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed.
2006), available at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/penumbra (defining penumbra as “a
partial shadow, as in an eclipse, between regions of complete shadow and complete illumination”).
119. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (“The foregoing cases suggest that
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance.”).
120. With apologies to the Bard, WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 3, sc. 2 (“I
come to bury Caesar, not to praise him.”).

2007]

THE DEFENSE OF TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE

1223

tests of “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” and “so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”
The Court’s opinion in Griswold was an ode to the traditional family based
on the sacred marriage of a man to a woman. For example:
This law, however, operates directly on an intimate relation of
husband and wife and their physician’s role in one aspect of that
relation.121
The present case, then, concerns a relationship [i.e., marriage]
lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees. And it concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating their
manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goals by means having a
maximum destructive impact upon that relationship. . . . Would
we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very
idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage
relationship. We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights—older than our political parties, older than our school
system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse,
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It
is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a
purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.122
I agree with the Court that Connecticut’s birth-control law
unconstitutionally intrudes upon the right of marital privacy . . . .
My conclusion [is] that the concept of liberty is not so restricted
and that it embraces the right of marital privacy . . . a right so basic
and fundamental and so deep-rooted in our society as the right of
privacy in marriage . . . . The Connecticut statutes here involved
deal with a particularly important and sensitive area of privacy—
that of the marital relation and the marital home . . . . Of this
whole “private realm of family life,” it is difficult to imagine what
is more private or more intimate than a husband and wife’s marital
relations. The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes
that clearly underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the
rights to marital privacy and to marry and raise a family are of
121. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482.
122. Id. at 485-86.
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similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically
protected. Although the Constitution does not speak in so many
words of the right of privacy in marriage, I cannot believe that it
offers these fundamental rights no protection. The fact that no
particular provision of the Constitution explicitly forbids the State
from disrupting the traditional relation of the family—a relation as
old and as fundamental as our entire civilization—surely does not
show that the Government was meant to have the power to do
so.123
Surely the right invoked in this case, to be free of regulation of the
intimacies of the marriage relationship, “come[s] to this Court with
a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties
which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements.”124
The legitimacy of government regulation of sexual conduct outside of a
traditional husband/wife marriage was also emphasized by the Justices:
The State, at most, argues that there is some rational relation
between this statute and what is admittedly a legitimate subject of
state concern—the discouraging of extra-marital relations . . . .
Finally, it should be said of the Court’s holding today that it in no
way interferes with a State’s proper regulation of sexual promiscuity or misconduct. As my Brother HARLAN so well stated in
his dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman, . . . “Adultery, homosexuality and the like are sexual intimacies which the State forbids . . . but the intimacy of husband and wife is necessarily an
essential and accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an
institution which the State not only must allow, but which always
and in every age it has fostered and protected. It is one thing when
the State exerts its power either to forbid extra-marital
sexuality . . . or to say who may marry, but it is quite another
when, having acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies inherent in it, it undertakes to regulate by means of the criminal law the
details of that intimacy.”125
This right of a husband and a wife to the privacy of their sexual
relationship within the marital bedroom is one that meets the tests outlined
in Palko, Glucksberg, and even footnote 6 of Michael H. It is narrowly
defined. It is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” in that no free,

123. Id. at 486, 491, 495-96 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 502-03 (White, J., concurring in the judgment; citations omitted).
125. Id. at 498 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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democratic society has existed in human history that permitted the
government to control the sexual activities of husbands and wives within
their homes. And it is “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental,” because, as the Justices pointed out
so eloquently in Griswold, the sanctity and privacy of marriage has been
accepted through centuries of Anglo-American common law history. As
the Court mentioned in the 1977 case of Moore v. City of East Cleveland,126
which overturned a woman’s conviction for violating a local housing
ordinance’s narrow definition of “family” by living with her son and two
grandsons: “Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the
sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is
deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”127
Had the Supreme Court entered the culture wars only to the extent of
Griswold, it would not have splintered our nation’s fabric as it has in
subsequent decisions, which disconnected the “right of privacy” from its
historical roots in marriage. No doubt battles over marriage, family, sexuality, homosexuality, abortion and similar issues would still be taking place
even without cases like Eisenstadt, Casey, and Lawrence. But without the
Supreme Court cutting off the possibility of legislative resolutions for these
culture wars, the political process would have been able to work as it was
designed to do. Political problems would move toward political solutions,
and the courts could allow the American people to choose their own social
agendas.

126. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
127. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503.

